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How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright? 
Rebecca Tushnet1 
 
Abstract: Derek Bambauer’s provocative paper argues that, because the remedies 
available to people who suffer unconsented distribution of intimate images of themselves 
are insufficient, we should amend copyright law to fill the gap.  Bambauer’s proposal 
requires significant changes to every part of copyright—what copyright seeks to 
encourage, who counts as an author/owner, what counts as an exclusive right, what 
qualifies as infringement, what suffices as a defense, and what remedies are available.  
These differences are not mere details.  Among other things, incentivizing intimacy is not 
the same thing as incentivizing creativity.  Bambauer’s argument that copyright is 
normatively empty and already full of inconsistencies and exceptions does not justify 
such profound changes. Bambauer’s true target is § 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act, which protects online intermediaries from liability stemming from users’ violations 
of others’ privacy.  Copyright claims aren’t subject to § 230, so his proposal hopes to 
force intermediaries to do more in revenge porn cases.  But the case for requiring more 
from intermediaries to protect privacy should be made on its own merits, not by 
distorting copyright law. 
 
Derek Bambauer’s provocative paper starts with a normative proposition: the remedies available 
to people who suffer unconsented distribution of intimate images of themselves, often known as 
revenge porn, are insufficient.  Bambauer is especially critical of the secondary liability regime 
for privacy torts.  At (First Amendment-inflected) common law, it is hard to hold distributors 
liable for such harm, and Congress has made it impossible online by enacting § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, which provides total immunity to a service provider uninvolved 
in developing tortious content.2  Copyright’s remedies, Bambauer observes, are much broader.  
And the lack of ability to control distribution is a disincentive for at least some people to create 
intimate pictures, even though the creation of intimate pictures might otherwise have social 
utility.  Because copyright is justified as a means of incentivizing creation, but mostly because its 
remedies are good ones, we should therefore call the harm done by unconsented distribution of 
intimate images “copyright harm.” 
 
Bambauer is not the first to notice that copyright’s remedies are far broader than those associated 
with other rights to control information.  Some victims of unconsented distribution of intimate 
images have already turned to copyright claims—mostly celebrities to date, but we can imagine 
more ordinary folks doing so as well.3  Likewise, trademark owners have made copyright claims 
when trademark’s remedies have proved insufficient for their desires.4  So have victims of 
1 Thanks to James Grimmelmann for helpful discussions and Rob McCabe for research assistance. 
2 Bambauer draft at 5. 
3 Rebecca Tushnet, Performance Anxiety: Copyright Embodied and Disembodied, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 
209 (2013). 
4 See, e.g., Sarah B. Deutsch, Re: Request for Public Comment on Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of 
Claimed Infringement, United States Copyright Office 2 (Nov. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/onlinesp/comments/2011/initial/verizon.pdf (noting DMCA notices sent on 
trademark grounds); Jennifer M. Urban and Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown 
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 
621, 668-70, 678 (2006) (discussing noncopyright claims framed as copyright claims for purposes of benefiting 
                                                 
negative reviews, circumventing defamation’s strict limits on liability.5  Of course, those 
limits—like trademark’s limits—are there for a reason, and so too with the privacy torts 
generally thought most apposite to the harm done by unconsented distribution of intimate 
images. 
 
So how should we think about Bambauer’s proposal?  As Part I of this response details, the 
proposal requires significant changes to every part of copyright—what copyright seeks to 
encourage, who counts as an author/owner, what counts as an exclusive right, what qualifies as 
infringement, what suffices as a defense, and what remedies are available.   
 
Part II argues that these differences are not merely definitional.  They go to the effects of the law 
as well as its goals.  Incentivizing intimacy is not the same thing as incentivizing creativity.  The 
motivations that induce people to create and share intimate images are unlikely to be affected by 
a change in copyright law that both creators and abusive disseminators are extremely unlikely to 
understand.  Copyright works, when it works, as incentive for economically motivated creators; 
it handles the non-economically motivated poorly, and it has no real mechanism for 
communicating its rules to the laypeople engaged in the bulk of the behavior Bambauer wishes 
to change.  Misunderstood penalties will neither incent nor deter as hoped. 
 
Bambauer nonetheless argues that the harm he targets is close enough to copyright harm that the 
right he wants to grant can fairly be called a copyright right, because copyright—particularly 
copyright’s concept of authorship—is normatively empty and can be filled any way we want to 
fill it.  He points to the inconsistencies and special pleading that abound in the current statute, 
and argues that adding a sexting epicycle to the current scheme wouldn’t make a difference 
worth protesting.  I disagree, because of the profound misfit between every aspect of copyright 
and the interests at issue here. 
 
Bambauer’s true target is the secondary liability rules for privacy violations, particularly § 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act.  He argues that intermediaries should be subject to legal 
constraints for enabling the unconsented dissemination of intimate media, and that the 
intermediary liability he envisions would be constitutional if based out of Title 17.  I believe that 
avoiding privacy law’s secondary liability regime by calling the proposed cause of action 
from DMCA takedown procedures); Fax from Creative Crystal Co. to Google, Inc. (Aug. 22, 2003), 
http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticeID=842 (last visited Oct. 15, 2005) (requesting takedown 
of sites which use Creative Crystal’s registered trademarks “in metatags and keywords up to 39 times on one page”). 
Euro-Excellence, Inc. v. Kraft Can., Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20 (Can.) (rejecting trademark owner’s attempt to use 
copyright to evade limits on trademark rights); Rebecca Tushnet, INTA: Pharma Panel and Keyword Panel, 
REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (May 8, 2012), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2012/05/inta-pharma-panel-and-
keyword-panel.html (discussing trademark counsel’s advice to claim copyright in logos and other marks in order to 
expand rights). 
5 See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 336 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (magnate tried to suppress 
biography by buying copyrights of quoted articles); Eric Goldman, Ripoff Report Ordered to Stop Publishing User-
Submitted Report—Giordano v. Romeo, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Jan. 4, 2011), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/01/ripoff_report_o.htm (business sued critic for defamation and acquired 
copyright in critical post, then sent copyright takedown); Eric Goldman, You Shouldn’t Need a Copyright Lawyer to 
Pick a Dentist--Lee v. Makhneich (Forbes Cross-Post), TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (April 23, 2013), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/04/you_shouldnt_ne.htm (explaining how some professionals have 
attempted to use copyright to remove negative online reviews). 
                                                                                                                                                             
“copyright” is a mistake.  If the secondary liability rules are wrong and there should be a notice 
and takedown scheme for revenge porn—something I’m open to agreeing with—then they 
should be changed, not evaded.  If the secondary liability rules are right, they should not be 
evaded.  And the collateral damage from evasion should not be excused by claiming that 
copyright is already bollixed. 
 
Ultimately, I can’t agree that we ought to be realists when it comes to escaping § 230 and 
formalists when it comes to evaluating the constitutionality of something labeled “copyright.”  
Bambauer argues both that the label “copyright” matters, because copyright is about something 
in particular and because violations of its exclusive rights deserve particular remedies, and also 
that the label is just a move in a language game.  Inconsistency is no great vice, but it’s no virtue 
either.  The case for a new intellectual property (or more properly, privacy or dignity) right for 
people depicted in intimate photos and videos could most persuasively be made on its own 
merits. 
 
I. Why Call It Copyright? 
 
Copyright, though it has many complex and reticulated niches, has a general structure.  Pamela 
Samuelson has recently undertaken a valuable taxonomic project on copyrightable subject 
matter, articulating criteria based on the history of and policies underlying copyright law for 
what should and shouldn’t be brought into the copyright regime (e.g., gardens, yoga, DNA 
sequences).6  While some of her criteria aren’t very relevant to Bambauer’s proposal, because he 
deals with photos and video that are already copyrightable subject matter and instead proposes to 
change authorship and rights definitions,7 several others provide useful guidance.  She suggests 
that, when considering an expansion of copyright law, we should consider the fit between 
copyright’s economic justification and the economic/incentive structure of the subject matter 
sought to be protected, specifically whether legal protection will spur investment into the 
production of multiple copies for the purpose of sale.8  We should also consider the fit between 
the subject matter and the legal structure of copyright: 
 
This includes the appropriateness of the exclusive rights, the duration of rights, 
infringement standards, and copyright remedies, as well as copyright doctrines, such as 
the idea/expression distinction, the scenes a faire and merger, fair use and first sale, 
classroom and other performance limitations, and the procedures by which copyright 
infringement is judged.  Often proponents of an expansion in copyright subject matter 
focus on a subset of the features of copyright’s legal regime, while ignoring respects in 
which a mismatch exists. While special rules can sometimes be developed to adjust the fit 
6 Pamela Samuelson, Are Gardens, Synthetic DNA, Yoga Sequences, and Fashions Copyrightable? (unpublished 
draft, on file with author) 
7 For example, the question of how long the subject matter at issue has existed and whether changed circumstances 
justify an expansion of copyright is less relevant to Bambauer’s proposal than to DNA sequences, as is whether the 
works communicate expressive content.  Id. at 22.   
8 Id. at 21.  Relatedly, she suggests evaluating the similarity of creators and creative outputs in the proposed subject 
matter to the creators and creative outputs of conventional copyrightable works: “[T]he greater the mismatch in 
these respects, the more likely it is that an extension of copyright to new subject matters will cause distortions or 
result in misapplications that will undermine the integrity of the copyright regime.”  Id.  at 22. 
                                                 
in copyright law, the legal regime fit should be an important criterion in judging whether 
subject matter expansion is a sound idea.9 
 
In line with Samuelson’s framework, the following subsections explore what Bambauer proposes 
to change—which turns out to be pretty much every aspect of copyright.  The overall effect is 
that the right he wants to create can’t be called “copyright” under any current meaning of the 
term. 
 
A. What is the incentive-based justification for the right? 
 
The subject matter of copyright has traditionally been limited by the concept of encouraging 
creation of expression, not just creation more generally. The threat of underproduction of an 
intangible value is addressed many different ways in law.  Patent, design patent, trade secret, 
trademark dilution, and the right of publicity all, at least according to their proponents, seek to 
encourage production by giving owners a right to exclude.10 
 
As noted by Bambauer and others, the right of privacy can also be seen to protect incentives 
generated by exclusive control.  The question is—control over what?  The answer usually allows 
us to identify the category of legal right at issue.  When we want the creator to have control over 
innovation, the relevant law is patent or trade secret.  When we want the creator to have control 
over marketing value, the relevant law is trademark dilution or the right of publicity.  Bambauer 
proposes to shift the locus of control over intimate expression from the right of privacy to 
copyright, but identifying “incentives” for “production” in general doesn’t justify putting 
anything into the copyright category in particular. 
 
Privacy, and the related ability to control the presentation of one’s self, support the development 
of that self.11  Privacy provides a space for experimentation, self-discovery, and intimacy, all of 
which are goods worth having.  Intimate media, Bambauer argues, can further these missions of 
self-discovery and intimate communication, and therefore incentivizing the creation of intimate 
media fits within copyright’s incentive paradigm.12 Tangible indicia of intimacy and self-
discovery, however, are valuable to self-development not because they are tangible, and not 
because they contain creative expression—those are just incidental phenomena related to the fact 
that modern Americans live digital, mediated lives—but rather because they support this private, 
desiring, intimate self.  As a result, the incentives Bambauer wishes to provide are not directed at 
generating expression fixed in a tangible medium, the traditional—and constitutionally 
9 Id. at 21-22.   
10  See, e.g., Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524 (1871) (design patent); Ass'n for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (patent); Restatement (Third) 
Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. a (1995) (trade secret); 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity & Privacy § 
2.2 (1987) (right of publicity); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 308-09 (1987) (trademark dilution). 
11 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, 1906 (2013) (“Privacy is shorthand for 
breathing room to engage in the processes of boundary management that enable and constitute self-development.”); 
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 532 (2006) (“The risk of disclosure can prevent 
people from engaging in activities that further their own self-development.”). 
12 I therefore find it curious that Bambauer argues that privacy theory doesn’t recognize the benefits of intimate 
media.  Bambauer at 55.  His description seems to me to fit very well into a discourse about the benefits of privacy, 
which include intimate interactions.   
                                                 
required—subject matter of copyright.13  Privacy’s intimacy-promoting goals would be equally 
well-served by (1) protecting nonexpressive/factual intimate communications, including 
communications too basic or standard to be deemed protectable by copyright under conventional 
copyright doctrine, and by (2) protecting unfixed communications such as realtime telephone 
conversations, video chats, or even face-to-face gossip.   
 
The examples Bambauer uses also show that the targeted harm is not about expression, but rather 
about the social meaning of exposure (especially for women): 
 
A female Yale Law School student targeted by defamatory attacks, including about her 
intimate life, on the AutoAdmit Web site did not obtain a single summer job offer during 
on-campus recruiting with law firms…. A student teacher was denied a degree in 
education after inadvertently revealing a MySpace photo that showed her drinking an 
alcoholic beverage while wearing a pirate costume. A Georgia high school teacher was 
forced to resign after a parent gained access to her Facebook profile and found a photo of 
her holding a pint of beer and glass of wine during a trip to Europe. In Florida, a high 
school English teacher was also pressed into quitting her job after her principal found 
photos of her modeling swimsuits, under a different name, online. Finally, Citibank 
terminated a female employee simply because she was judged to be both attractive and 
given to wearing clothes that accentuated her appeal.14 
 
Notice that all these examples involve gender role enforcement (including concerns about 
women’s public consumption of alcohol), but not intimate media.  That Bambauer rightly 
identifies them as part of the same problem as nonconsensual distribution of intimate media 
indicates that the harm is something different than what his proposed solution targets.15  
“Revenge porn employs the darker part of the human emotional spectrum: shame, humiliation, 
fear, and disgust,”16 and it is that source of harm that privacy/dignity-based torts target.  By 
contrast, copyright usually refuses to recognize harm to the copyright owner’s dignity as a source 
of actionable harm: Anne Rice may feel personally assaulted by bad reviews or parodies,17 but 
that’s just too bad for her unless the attack rises to the level of defamation or intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
 
Bambauer’s proposal would give copyright new missions: incentivize the creation of intimacy 
and prevent harms from exposure, mainly harms suffered by women.  These might well be valid 
goals, but not ones that fit copyright’s contours.   
 
13 See U.S. Const., art 1, §8, cl. 8 (allowing Congress to protect “[w]ritings” of “[a]uthors,” both terms with arguable 
limiting force); 17 U.S.C. §102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression ….”); Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service 
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“Originality is a constitutional requirement.… [O]riginality requires independent 
creation plus a modicum of creativity ….”). 
14 Bambauer, at 14-15 (footnotes omitted). 
15 Cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 34 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705 (1982) (sexualized 
advertising does the same kind of harm as pornography). 
16 Bambauer at 17 (footnote omitted). 
17 Sarah Lyall, The People Have Spoken, and Rice Takes Offense, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/11/books/11rice.html?_r=0. 
                                                 
B. Who counts as the author/owner of the right? 
 
Bambauer’s proposed right is not a conventional authorship right.  Instead of the author of the 
fixed work—the person or persons who contributed sufficient copyrightable creativity and 
exercised sufficient control over the final work—being the copyright owner, the subject would 
own a “copyright” interest under Bambauer’s model.  Each subject would enjoy a right to 
prevent distribution of intimate media, even as against the person who would otherwise be 
deemed the copyright owner.18  This new right would apparently cover all “intimate media,” but 
the proposed definition doesn’t include any requirement that the media have been created with an 
intent to limit distribution.  Thus, it would appear to work a profound change in the default 
ownership rules for pornography as well as for any other photos and video containing sexually 
explicit elements, something one might imagine both the adult entertainment and the mainstream 
film/TV industry might wish to weigh in on before enactment.19 
 
Also unlike a regular copyright right, the intimate media right would be waivable (in writing), 
but not alienable.20  Copyrights can presently be licensed nonexclusively based on oral 
agreements or by implication from the parties’ conduct.21  Bambauer’s rule for intimate media 
would require a written agreement even for a nonexclusive license.22  Likewise, because one 
problem that arises in intimate media is that one member of a couple shares a sex tape featuring 
both of them, waiver by one participant would not waive others’ rights, again in contrast to 
existing law, including the existing moral rights provisions in the Copyright Act;23 presently, 
joint authors can grant nonexclusive licenses without the consent of other joint authors.24   
 
C. What qualifies as infringement? 
 
18 Bambauer at 30 (proposal would “curtail the distribution and display rights enjoyed by the copyright owner of 
intimate media”).  It is also unclear whether this new interest would affect the copyright term, which for works not 
created as works for hire is life of the author plus 70 years.  Logically, we could treat the new copyright owner the 
way we treat joint authors—the term of a joint work is the life of the longest-surviving author plus 70 years.   
19 Bambauer proposes that this right will be waivable in writing, but that’s not sufficient for the modern film 
industry, which universally seeks work-for-hire status so that the funding/producing entity is deemed the author of 
the work from the outset.  Among other things, a mere copyright transfer from the performer is terminable after 35 
years.  See 17 U.S.C. § 203.  Perhaps Bambauer means that waiver should not be considered a “transfer” and 
therefore not terminable; if so, his proposal has yet another point of divergence from current copyright law.  (No 
court would allow the use of the term “waiver” to defeat §203 termination rights in other circumstances; §203 was 
designed to be unwaivable. Cf. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that an after-
the-fact agreement that a work was a work for hire is an unenforceable “agreement to the contrary” that can’t 
prevent termination given Congress’s intent to protect authors).)  Or perhaps Bambauer would allow the creation of 
works for hire outside the scope of this new right, which for nonemployees would require (1) a written agreement, 
and (2) that the work fall within the enumerated statutory categories of works that can be works for hire.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 101.  In the case of standalone photographs, this might prove a bit tricky, since it’s hard to jam photos into 
any of those categories, but for films and photos intended for inclusion in magazines and the like it could probably 
be done with relative ease.    
20 Bambauer at 30. 
21 See, e.g., Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990). 
22 Bambauer at 26. 
23 Bambauer at 31.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (granting limited moral rights of attribution and integrity to certain works 
of visual art); id. §106A(b) (providing that joint authors are co-owners of these moral rights). 
24 Bambauer at 13 (“Even if a participant were deemed a joint author of the intimate media [under existing law], she 
would be powerless to prevent her co-author from giving  permission for the work’s use, regardless of her wishes.”). 
                                                 
Bambauer proposes that the owner of the intimate media right would have the right to prevent 
distribution of the work.25  This right would apparently not be the right to authorize distribution 
without the consent of the person who would ordinarily be considered the copyright owner, but a 
purely prohibitory right.  So, if the subject wasn’t also the cameraperson, she wouldn’t by herself 
be able to authorize distribution.  By contrast, existing copyright rights are rights to authorize, 
not just rights to prohibit; as noted in the previous section, joint authors can grant licenses 
without other authors’ consent.  It is not clear whether this negative right would have the same 
duration as a copyright (currently life plus seventy years). 
 
In addition, the intimate media right would go beyond the current §106 right to control public 
performance and display and create a new right to control private performance and display.26  
The right would thus cover instances in which a recipient called his friends over to look at the 
image on his phone, which again sounds more like a privacy right than a copyright.  
 
D. What are the defenses to infringement? 
 
Bambauer proposes to eliminate the existing defenses to copyright infringement for intimate 
media, including most notably fair use, though presumably the exceptions for educational 
institutions, nonprofit performances, etc. would also all have to go.   
 
Because the “intimate media” definition would cover all sexual photos and visuals, even if they 
were created for distribution, this could have significant effects on fair use cases, which often 
involve sexuality.27  Consider the recent and already influential case Prince v. Cariou,28 in which 
appropriation artist Richard Prince took photos of Rastafarians and combined them with images 
of naked women taken from soft-core magazines: 
 
25 Bambauer at 30.  Bambauer also proposes that only actual images should be covered. Bambauer, at 29.  I’m not 
sure this definition would be likely to survive the drafting process—why not also cover avatars?  The interest in 
them, especially as they improve in verisimilitude, is likely to be similar, and the right of publicity has similarly 
expanded to cover virtual representations.  See, e.g., Hart v. Electronic Arts, 717 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
26 Bambauer at 30. 
27 See Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex. Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L., 273, 278-79 (2007). 
28 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
                                                 
29 
 
The photographer mostly lost his infringement claim because the use was transformative, 
bringing new messages and new meanings to the original photos.  But under Bambauer’s new 
rule, the models portrayed in the soft-core magazines would have a valid infringement claim 
(against Prince and against me) because they didn’t consent to Prince’s use. 
 
Bambauer offers a slightly different scenario: 
 
Consider an artist who uses a photograph of his naked partner in his artwork—perhaps he 
is mashing up Soviet-era propaganda images with nude photos. That display of the 
intimate photo is highly transformative, pushing the analysis towards finding the use fair. 
But, this is irrelevant to his partner, who may not want the photo displayed, regardless of 
its artsy surroundings. The possibility of being involuntarily featured may dissuade her 
from posing for the photo at all.30 
 
The use of the hypothetical partner, instead of the image ripped from a magazine (as occurred in 
Cariou), leaves the impression that the problem is only relational (making it appropriate for a 
privacy tort), so that we needn’t worry about fair use.  But fair use’s transformativeness doctrine 
specifically favors precisely the kinds of uses that make copyright owners, and sometimes the 
subjects of their works, feel bad—critical, mocking, even cruel uses.31  These fair uses may 
decrease the incentive to produce works compared to a world in which criticism wasn’t allowed, 
but copyright has deliberately chosen not to provide that kind of incentive to authors and 
owners.32   
29 Richard Prince, Djuana Barnes. 
30 Bambauer at 39 (footnotes omitted).   
31 See, e.g., Liebovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1998).   
32 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-92 (1994) (“[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing 
theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act. 
                                                 
 
Bambauer proposes to substitute a newsworthiness defense for fair use.33  That would still seem 
to spell trouble for Richard Prince (though maybe not for me), as the specific images of the 
women in the pictures are unlikely to be newsworthy, though I can imagine some courts 
contorting themselves to find newsworthiness based on the women’s prior consent to appear in a 
soft-core magazine.   
 
But newsworthiness isn’t a copyright defense.34  If fair use is a poor fit for the interests that the 
proposal addresses, they might not be copyright interests.  As Bambauer notes, there are existing 
causes of action that have newsworthiness defenses and don’t have fair use defenses.  They’re 
privacy torts, whose precedent Bambauer suggests courts could incorporate in defining the 
boundaries of the new defense.35  But if privacy and newsworthiness go so well together, what’s 
wrong with using the existing privacy torts?  Bambauer’s answer is that the trouble lies with 
existing remedies, to which I now turn. 
 
E. What are the remedies for infringement? 
 
1. Statutory damages 
 
Statutory damages, enforced by private parties, are one key reason to choose copyright instead of 
some other law, according to Bambauer.36  But, though Bambauer says “[d]amages would follow 
copyright’s established system,”37 he proposes to change that system.  Bambauer notes that 
getting a lawyer to take a revenge porn case is difficult, and so is getting a lawyer to take an 
ordinary copyright case.38  Some revenge porn cases won’t involve works that were timely 
registered (registered before the infringement began or within a few months of publication),39 
and timely registration is a prerequisite for an award of statutory damages and attorney’s fees, 
even assuming that the individual infringer had enough cash to pay an award.40  Bambauer 
Because ‘parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying it commercially as well as 
artistically,’ the role of the courts is to distinguish between ‘[b]iting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] 
copyright infringement[, which] usurps it.’”) (citations omitted). 
33 Bambauer at 38.   
34 Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985). 
35 Bambauer at 38. 
36 Bambauer at 25.   
37 Bambauer at 33. 
38 Cf. Mickey H. Osterreicher & Alicia Wagner Calzada, Comments of the National Press Photographers 
Association, Nat'l Press Photographers Ass'n, at 7 (Oct. 27, 2011), 
http://blogs.nppa.org/advocacy/files/2012/01/final_ Copyright-Small-Claims-Comments-01-17-12-1.pdf  (describing 
photo infringement as rampant online and stating that “most will never be prosecuted because it is economically 
unfeasible for the creators to commence an action in federal court”). 
39 I’m not so sure about this—the works involved in revenge porn cases may well count as unpublished, as long as 
the creator didn’t publish them herself.  Distribution to a limited group with no purpose of further distribution is 
probably not publication.  Thus, registration before filing suit might well qualify the victim for statutory damages, 
assuming she’s the copyright owner.  See Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study, 87 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 135, 147 (2011).  And juries probably would consider the awfulness of the disseminator’s 
harassing and demeaning motive in setting a statutory damage award, even though that’s not generally a factor in 
copyright statutory damage awards (again, because revenge porn doesn’t implicate ordinary copyright interests). 
40 Bambauer at 21. 
                                                                                                                                                             
would solve this problem by removing the timely registration requirement for statutory 
damages.41 
 
But there is no reason that a standalone, sui generis law against revenge porn couldn’t also allow 
for private remedies, including statutory damages.  No reason, that is, other than § 230, which 
would block the imposition of statutory damages on intermediaries, even ones who refused to 
honor takedown requests after a plaintiff succeeded in winning a claim against an unauthorized 
sharer of intimate media.42  The sharers themselves, however, could likely be made individually 
liable for statutory damages under a specifically drafted law targeting revenge porn as a privacy 
tort—this could supplement or replace potential criminal liability.43  At the very least, it would 
be fruitful to explore the justifications for and potential arguments against a sui generis right, as 
Pam Samuelson and Jerome Reichman among others have done with respect to other interests 
that don’t fit well with current intellectual property regimes.44 
 
Statutory damages still might not be enough to convince an attorney to sue a victim’s horrible 
ex-boyfriend, unless he also happens to have $150,000 in the bank.  Only big firms tend to seek 
statutory damages against petty infringers like music uploaders Jammie Thomas and Joel 
Tenenbaum.45  There is not much chance these statutory damages awards will ever be paid, and 
the recording industry couldn’t have thought they would be; its lawyers got paid to send a 
message.   
 
The only predictable, law-abiding deep pockets in this area belong to intermediaries, which is 
why Bambauer also suggests changing the law governing them. 
 
2. Intermediary liability 
 
Bambauer proposes altering 17 U.S.C. § 512, which currently provides a notice and takedown 
scheme for alleged copyright infringement.  He suggests that § 512 should be altered with 
respect to intimate media specifically, and that this would be simple to implement because 
internet service providers are already familiar with this provision (known as DMCA notice and 
takedown).46  The new system would be similar to the existing DMCA, but with different 
information provision and redaction requirements.  It’s not clear whether Bambauer supports the 
41 Bambauer at 35. 
42 See Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929 (D. Ariz. 2008) (allowing 
intermediary to refuse original poster’s request to take down content and still keep §230 protection). 
43 See Danielle Keats Citron, ‘Revenge Porn’ should be a crime, CNN OPINION (Aug. 30, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/opinion/citron-revenge-porn/index.html?hpt=hp_t4; Mary Anne Franks, 
Combating Non-Consensual Pornography: A Working Paper, Sept. 18, 2013, available at 
http://www.endrevengeporn.org/uploads/1/3/2/8/13286642/franks_ncp_working_paper_9.18.pdf  (proposing draft 
criminalization bill). 
44  See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 51, 113-
37 (1997) (discussing justifications for and arguments against sui generis protection for data); Pamela Samuelson, 
Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308, 2310-12 (1994) (arguing for sui generis protection for computer programs). 
45 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of 
Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 454 (2009) (noting that in practice statutory damages are mainly sought by 
large firms). 
46 Bambauer at 27; see id. at 36-37 (describing new system). 
                                                 
existing DMCA rule that a counter-notification entitles the intermediary to restore access to the 
accused work unless the claimant files suit.47   
 
Nor is it clear that Bambauer would allow existing defenses for intermediaries.  Compliance with 
the DMCA provides relief from any money damages that would otherwise be available to a 
plaintiff, but, even for non-DMCA compliant services, the ordinary rules of secondary liability 
would still require the plaintiff to establish that the intermediary was contributorily or vicariously 
liable for the infringing content before any remedy could be available against the intermediary.48  
A blogger who allows comments may not have a DMCA agent on file with the Copyright Office 
and would therefore be ineligible for DMCA protection, but the blogger is still not automatically 
liable for infringement when a commenter posts infringing material.  Thus, in some 
circumstances, an intermediary could choose noncompliance with notice and takedown and still 
evade liability under existing law.49 
 
I’m unsure that the problems of intimate media distribution are amenable to the DMCA solution.  
One major source of trouble in the sexting realm has been photos shared through secure 
messaging services (SMS).  Those systems aren’t set up to make notice and takedown effective, 
and standard phone networks that carry SMS don’t meet the underlying standards for secondary 
copyright liability (though, again, perhaps Bambauer is also willing to change those).50  
Traditional websites would be covered by this new right, but to the extent that intimate media 
circulate in different ways from the average DMCA target does, that’s a further indication that 
what we have isn’t a copyright problem. 
 
F. Summary: A right granted by Title 17, not a copyright 
 
Bambauer proposes a right with a different justification from copyright, owned by someone other 
than the ordinary copyright owner, infringed by different acts, with different defenses, and with 
different remedies.  When you’re making this many changes, it might be time to admit that the 
proposal does not involve copyright, but rather a sui generis right placed in Title 17 for another 
purpose.  That purpose, as the next part explores, is to avoid CDA § 230.  This makes his 
47 He speaks of the subject’s written consent as a defense, and of the intermediary’s immunity after complying with 
a takedown notice as a reason not to worry about the intermediary’s difficulty in verifying written consent, 
Bambauer at 37, but that just means the intermediary will always take down content whenever a notice is proper in 
form, in order to secure that immunity.  Should a counter-notification that claims to have written consent be 
sufficient to lead to a “put-back”?  The copyright analogy would suggest that the answer is yes, since the 
intermediary is in no position to judge the facts. 
48 See, e.g., Hotfile decision (finding Hotfile ineligible for DMCA safe harbor, but not necessarily liable on 
contributory infringement theory). 
49 There are other ways to evade liability, of course: not all websites are amenable to U.S. jurisdiction.  See Lorelei 
Laird, Victims Are Taking on ‘Revenge Porn’ Websites for Posting Photos They Didn’t Consent To, ABA Journal, 
Nov 1, 2013 4:30 AM CDT, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/victims_are_taking_on_revenge_porn_websites_for_posting_photos_t
hey_didnt_c/ (“It’s an inexpensive way to get photos taken down—if it works. But website operators overseas or 
those who believe they’re judgment-proof can and do ignore the [DMCA] notices. . .. And as [Professor Eric] 
Goldman notes, foreign websites don’t care about DMCA takedown notices. Indeed, several sites have reportedly 
moved to overseas hosts to avoid legal consequences in the U.S.”). 
50 See Luvdarts, LLC v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068, 1072-73  (9th Cir. 2013) (owners of multimedia 
messaging networks couldn’t be held liable for copyright infringement by users; plaintiff couldn’t successfully 
allege contributory or vicarious liability). 
                                                 
proposal notably distinct from other not-quite-copyright interventions into the statute such as 
microchip design protection or vessel hull design protection. 
 
II. Why Not Call It Copyright? 
 
Why are all these changes required to make revenge porn fit a copyright model?  In this part, I 
suggest that renaming the problem of revenge porn is unlikely to help us solve it.  The incentive 
theory does not justify creating a new intimate media right in Title 17, because copyright 
doctrine’s levers for affecting human motivations don’t fit the behaviors at issue, though privacy 
law’s might.  Copyright law’s present messiness is an insufficient justification for making so 
many alterations to copyright’s foundations, and the constitutional issues raised by the new right 
will still exist no matter its statutory surrounding.  Finally, calling a new right a “copyright” has 
risks of its own, given Bambauer’s desire to evade § 230.  
 
A. Not All Incentives Are the Same51 
 
This mismatch between copyright’s incentive paradigm and the benefits of intimate 
communication isn’t just theoretical or definitional.  It can’t be fixed by deciding that we want 
“copyright” to incentivize more than just expression.  Bambauer writes that “the classic 
justification for copyright” is that “the threat of uncontrolled copying deters potential creators.”52  
The extent to which copyright incentivizes expression in the first place—as opposed to 
distribution—is hotly contested.53  And Bambauer’s description of copyright cuts off the 
specifically economic rationale of the copyright story: the threat of uncontrolled copying deters 
potential creators who need or want to get paid for creating works.54  As the Supreme Court 
explained: 
 
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and 
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is 
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 
“Science and useful Arts.” Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve 
rewards commensurate with the services rendered.55 
51 Bambauer proposes a right to suppress dissemination.  This is not necessarily economic in nature, just as there are 
some personhood-based accounts of copyright rights that value the right to withhold works.  See, e.g., Harper & 
Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985).  But it is ultimately enforced by the prospect of 
damages against ISPs who refuse to honor takedown notices.  This is its primary difference from current law, which 
is why I speak of economic incentives. 
52 Bambauer, manuscript at 12. 
53 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Copyright Without Creators (Univ. of S. Cal. Gould Sch. of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13-7) (arguing that copyright makes the most sense conceived of as an incentive 
for intermediaries to invest in monetization of authors’ creations), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2245038.  Copyright might well use distribution purely 
instrumentally as a tool to compensate and incentivize authors, see Wendy J. Gordon, Dissemination Must Serve 
Authors: How the U.S. Supreme Court Erred, 10 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1 (2013), but my point is 
that copyright is generally thought of as an incentive for creation because copyright protects works once publicly 
disseminated, usually for profit. 
54 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“T]he Framers intended 
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”). 
55 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (emphasis added). 
                                                 
 
This is why copyright provides primarily economic rights, with only extremely limited moral 
rights for certain limited-edition visual works,56 and why sometimes copyright provides only 
compulsory licenses—a right to get paid—instead of a right to control.57  The right to get paid is 
deemed sufficient to induce creation of the kinds of works copyright seeks to incentivize.58 
 
Bambauer later gives a more complete account of the conventional justification, noting that 
“[a]uthors face the time and expense of creating works initially, and must price this sunk cost 
into their per-copy fee (average cost)…. Copyright law is one way out of this dilemma [in which 
consumers would prefer to get a copy from a lower-cost copier who didn’t invest in creation]: it 
forces consumers to pay the author, at average cost, to bribe the author to produce the work 
initially.”59  But, as Bambauer immediately acknowledges,60 the “time and expense” faced by the 
ordinary author creating with the hope of remuneration isn’t the same as the intimate risks 
Bambauer identifies that might stop a potential creator of intimate media in her tracks.  With 
intimate media, creators aren’t looking to be “bribed” to surrender their photos.  Nor are copyists 
generally looking to sell the photos once acquired. 
 
Even creators of works who intend them to be distributed are only patchily affected by 
copyright’s incentives,61 and the failure to fit is even greater with intimate works not intended for 
public distribution.  Bambauer’s example of the disparate use of intimate media by LGBT 
individuals is an excellent illustration of the issue:62 it is hard to imagine that sexual identity is 
correlated with anything copyright might incentivize, or with knowledge of the difference 
between the DMCA and § 230 of the CDA.  Rather (on the assumption that current law offers no 
protection), LGBT individuals may simply be bearing more risks in their relationships, as they 
do in many other ways, regardless of the state of intellectual property and privacy law. 
 
But set that all aside for the moment.  To get an incentive effect from an extension of legal 
protection, people would have to know the law and believe that they can effectively make use of 
it if their trust is betrayed.63  Both of these assumptions are hard to credit.  At the start, there’s 
the optimism bias Bambauer discusses:64 just as most people who get married are sure that they 
won’t be among the large percentage of couples who divorce, most people who send intimate 
media are sure they won’t be victims of a perfidious partner.  As one victim recounted, “He said 
56 17 U.S.C. §106A. 
57 17 U.S.C. §114. 
58 Cf. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 
(2007) (proposing to replace most of copyright with compulsory licenses to better fulfill its incentive function in the 
digital age). 
59 Bambauer at 18. 
60 Id. (“This simple economic story falls apart completely for intimate media. People create these videos and images 
for non-pecuniary reasons: to express affection and lust, to remain connected to an existing partner, to court a new 
one.”). 
61 See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
513-546 (2009) (discussing nonmonetary incentives for creation); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as 
Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29 (2011) (same). 
62 Bambauer, manuscript at 9. 
63 See, e.g., Bambauer at 21 (“[T]he minority of people who sext are well aware of the risks of doing so. Their 
numbers would probably grow if those risks dropped.”) (footnote omitted).   
64 Bambauer at 16. 
                                                 
if I didn’t want to send them to him, that meant that I didn’t trust him, which meant that I didn’t 
love him.”65 As she told the New York Times, even after her experience of having her pictures 
posted online—which included being stalked by a stranger—her own friends continued to send 
nude pictures of themselves to their boyfriends.  “You don’t want to really think that five years 
down the line, your boyfriend at the time could be your not-boyfriend and do something really 
bad to you.”66 
 
In addition to the optimism bias, people simply don’t think about the law when they create 
intimate media, which means that increased legal protection wouldn’t spur more creation. In 
order for Bambauer’s incentives to work, creators of intimate media would have to believe that 
the change in the legal regime had been absorbed by recipients with enough certainty that the 
recipients would be noticeably more likely to hesitate—while in the mood to get revenge—
before sharing.  It is hard to imagine a rational calculation in this form: “yes, I don’t trust him all 
the way, and he might show the pictures to all his friends, but I’d be able to sue him and his ISP 
for damages if he did, so that gives me the extra confidence I need to send the pictures.”67   
 
In practice, these calculations aren’t done consciously, but rather with the aid of background 
heuristics, expectations, and assumptions.  But those assumptions aren’t likely to be correct.  
Misunderstandings about law, particularly intellectual property law, are widespread.68  To the 
extent that people already believe that their intimate media are legally protected, of course, they 
will not be deterred from creating media now, though they may later be harmed by a relationship 
betrayal, and they need no additional incentive for creation.69  To the extent that they don’t 
65 See,e.g., Erica Goode, Victims Push Laws to End Online Revenge Posts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2013 (quoting 
victim). 
66 Id. 
67 Cf. Bambauer at 13 (“Romantic partners who understand this legal peculiarity may be deterred from producing 
intimate media, surrendering a benefit to themselves and, by extension, to society.”) (emphasis added).  Bambauer is 
skeptical both that no one is deterred from producing intimate media by this risk and also that the risk is part of the 
fun for any significant number of producers.  Bambauer at 22.  I’m more unsure; sex has a funny relationship to risk. 
Carlos Danger/Anthony Weiner, one of Bambauer’s cautionary tales, is a good example: his right to control his 
media output was irrelevant to what he did, and we might speculate that compulsion ruled.  I don’t contest that 
believing that one had perfect control over dissemination could increase creation overall.  Snapchat is popular for a 
reason.  But creation stories are often a lot more complicated than a pure dose-response relationship.  
68 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 237-39 (1991) (describing copyright myths 
believed by nonlawyers); Cecilia Ogbu, I Put Up a Website About My Favorite Show and All I Got Was This Lousy 
Cease-and-Desist Letter: The Intersection of Fan Sites, Internet Culture, and Copyright Owners, 12 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 279, 284-85 (2003) (noting widespread misunderstanding of copyright law); Carolyn Elefant, 
Judicial Candidates Brawl over Campaign Slogans, LEGAL BLOG WATCH (Sept. 5 2008, 03:17 PM), 
http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2008/09/judicial-candid.html (candidate for judicial office 
confuses trademark claim with copyright claim). See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON 
PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998) (cataloging ways in which lay understandings of law diverge 
from formal law). 
69 Bambauer argues that a residual right of a recipient to possess intimate media, even after the end of a relationship, 
is not problematic because that’s a manageable risk for creators: (1) it’s well-known that former lovers can hang on 
to memorabilia, and (2) risk-averse creators can use time-limited media such as Snapchat.  Bambauer at 31.  As to 
the former point, Bambauer’s argument for providing a new right was that it would provide an additional incentive 
to create intimate media.  The problem he identifies isn’t lack of knowledge of the risk of dissemination, but rather 
knowledge and the associated rational response to that risk: limiting production.  The same incentive logic would 
seem to apply to the common knowledge that memorabilia often outlast a relationship.  As to the latter point, if 
technological self-help is sufficient to deal with residual risk, why isn’t it enough to reassure the risk-sensitive 
                                                 
understand their rights, the issue is largely one of education, and even a change in the law won’t 
change that lack of understanding.  The knowledge gap affects both the creators (in need of 
incentives) and the unauthorized disseminators (in need of disincentives). 
 
Consider in this context the teenagers who’ve been arrested for disseminating child pornography 
because they shared intimate media, sometimes consensually.70  Whether the problem lies in 
their understanding of the law, or their practical capacity to conform their conduct to the law, an 
additional civil remedy seems unlikely to deter what criminal law and the prospect of lifetime 
sex offender registration hasn’t.71  Nor are most producers of explicit intimate media likely to be 
complying with 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a), which provides that any person who produces visual 
depictions of “actual sexually explicit conduct” must “create and maintain individually 
identifiable records pertaining to every performer portrayed.”72  Many producers and 
disseminators of intimate media could have bigger problems than copyright, if the law ever came 
knocking.73  If we’re really worried about people declining to create intimate media because they 
accurately understand the state of the law, we might want to look at the criminal code first.  In 
truth, as Bambauer says, “the deterrence story is simply that: a story. It does no real work in 
changing behavior.”74  (He says that about the creators of intimate media, but it is at least as true 
of the distributors.) 
 
people now?  After all, Snapchat is most risk-limiting with respect to short-term or new relationships.  The person 
who creates intimate media with or for someone she’s been seeing for five years is less likely to use Snapchat 
precisely because she trusts her partner. 
70 See, e.g., John A. Humbach, ‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433 (2010); Beth 
Defalco, Girl, 14, Arrested over Nude Pics of Herself, THE DENVER POST (Mar. 27, 2009), 
http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_12006602; Caroline Zielinski, Teens Arrested over Explicit Photos, THE AGE 
VICTORIA (July 3, 2013), http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/teens-arrested-over-explicit-photos-20130703-
2pb65.html. 
71 It’s also notable that many people of sexting age probably have downloaded music and/or movies without 
permission from copyright owners.  Technology, not Ethics, Worry Teens about Illegal Downloading, Study Says, 
INTERNET RETAILER (May 21, 2004), http://www.internetretailer.com/2004/05/21/technology-not-ethics-worry-
teens-about-illegal-downloading-s (finding that over 50% of teens have illegally downloaded music).  If people of 
sexting age don’t fear statutory damages enough to avoid unauthorized downloads, how likely is it that they’ll fear 
statutory damages enough to decide against sharing a sexy photo? 
72 Not all intimate media would qualify: only “images of intercourse, masturbation, or a ‘lascivious display’ of 
genitals, as opposed to nudity or other sexually suggestive poses” are covered by the law.  Free Speech Coalition, 
Inc. v. Holder, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2013 WL 3761077, at *20 (E.D. Pa. 2013).  Still, the intimate media Bambauer 
discusses would apparently include many works also covered by § 2257.  A producer subject to § 2257 must “affix[] 
to every copy of any [visual depiction covered by § 2257] . . . a statement describing where the records required by 
[§ 2257] with respect to all performers depicted in that copy of the matter may be located.” Id. at (e)(1). Producers 
must maintain copies of their performers’ identification documents and make those records available for inspection 
by the Attorney General. Id. at (b)(3) and (c).  Producers may be exposed to criminal liability if they “fail to create 
or maintain the records as required” or knowingly violate other provisions of the law, including knowingly 
transferring any visual depiction subject to § 2257 that does not contain the required label. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(f)(1)-
(5). 
73 Cf. Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 336-39 (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to decide whether § 2257 
was overbroad as applied to media created, but not distributed, by couples for their own enjoyment; government 
disclaimed intent to enforce law against materials that were never distributed).  It’s unclear whether the 
government’s promise would extend to the kinds of intimate media sharing Bambauer discusses, though a 
determined prosecutor could likely proceed in some of the scenarios Bambauer describes. 
74 Bambauer at 16. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Relatedly, most people never consult lawyers, and most legal wrongs go unredressed in court.75  
Victims may have difficulty finding a lawyer with expertise in the subject.  They may be 
ashamed of being betrayed, and fear greater exposure if they sue—this is known as the 
“Streisand effect” from an early case in which photos of Barbra Streisand’s house spread more 
widely as she attempted to suppress them.  Many of the victims whose cases Bambauer discusses 
would already have been able to send DMCA takedown notices.  In any case in which they were 
both the subject and the photographer/videographer (that is, any case involving a “selfie”), they 
would already be authors under current law.  Both Bambauer and I agree that the fact that those 
victims are also considered “authors” is unrelated to the harm they suffer from unconsented 
distribution.  Nonetheless, it’s notable that lawyers don’t seem to be bringing droves of copyright 
infringement lawsuits on behalf of selfie victims. 
 
Even for existing author-victims, of course, Bambauer’s proposed reforms could increase the 
chance of receiving damages from a potentially deep-pocketed intermediary, so perhaps lawyers 
would more aggressively seek out clients (though if there’s widespread compliance with the 
amended DMCA, then we’re back to the scenario in which there’s not much money in any given 
case).  My aim in this section is simply to show that the identification of behaviors we wish to 
incentivize does not mean that copyright is an appropriate tool, even if copyright is also about 
incentives. 
 
B. Tu Quoque: Is this any worse than what we already have? 
 
Bambauer’s basic response to the distinctions between what we now call copyright and what he 
wants to add to Title 17 is to point to the inconsistencies in current copyright law: 
 
[C]opyright is nothing if not a congeries of industry-specific tweaks. Copyrights in sound 
recordings do not include a right of public performance—except via digital audio 
transmission. Architectural works under copyright have no protection against 
photographs or pictures that reproduce a building instantiating the work, so long as that 
building is publicly visible. The first sale doctrine lets lawful purchasers rent movie 
DVDs, but not software DVDs. A small cafe may show television programming on a set 
behind the bar [without paying a license fee], but a giant restaurant in Times Square may 
not—unless it complies with restrictions on the size and number of televisions and 
speakers. Copyright is unprincipled: it is all about special pleading. Distortion of an 
elegant copyright system is not a risk, because it is already distorted.76  
 
Indeed, U.S. copyright law has a number of medium- and industry-specific provisions that 
mostly can be explained by lobbying and special pleading.  Copyright isn’t pure, so, the 
argument goes, introducing another impurity is not a problem.   
75 Cf. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND 
PATIENT COMPENSATION 61-76 (1993) (survey results show that a significant number of medical malpractice 
victims never file tort claims). See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (discussing general 
reluctance of many people to litigate disputes even when law is clear); EWICK & SILBEY, supra note [] (discussing 
nonlawyers’ use and understanding of law in ordinary life and unwillingness to use legal system except in rare 
circumstances);  
76 Bambauer at 45 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 25-26 (noting existence of overlapping claims in the current 
system). 
                                                 
 
At some point, however, impurity converts to a new substance, which is what Bambauer’s 
proposal does.  None of the provisions Bambauer discusses were introduced merely to 
circumvent limits on some other right,77 which is why none of them required wholesale changes 
in every aspect of copyright—the addition of a digital public performance right for sound 
recordings, for example, didn’t require a change in authorship rules, liability standards, or fair 
use defenses.  Nor did the extension of protection to architectural works (required by our 
accession to the Berne Convention).78   
 
Relatedly, all of these are industry-specific tweaks, directed at the economic needs and market 
configurations that were current at the moment the legislature acted.  They aren’t content-based.  
By contrast, the intimate media right isn’t about the business deals and compromises made by 
any industry.  It’s about protecting a privacy interest.  If an intimate media right is a copyright, I 
have difficulty seeing the barriers to giving a victim of defamation a copyright, or even doing the 
same for any subject of a work, defamatory or not.79  Authorship may be a highly flexible 
concept, but that doesn’t make it entirely meaningless. 
 
I’m a fan of categorical thinking.  It can make sense to group “games” together even if we can 
say that chess doesn’t share any significant characteristics with bouncing a ball, as long as each 
game has family resemblances to other games in the group.80  Still, there is a difference between 
a concept with a wide range of reasonable meanings and a concept that has been completely 
emptied out.81  To my mind, calling an intimate media right “copyright” would tilt too far to the 
latter. 
 
C. Constitutionality of the New System 
 
Bambauer is aware that he’s suggesting some radical revisions.  Among the consequences is the 
potential vulnerability of his new right to a First Amendment challenge, even though copyright 
laws are generally unproblematic under current doctrine.  Bambauer suggests that his proposal 
would be constitutionally suspect if called a privacy right, but that the relaxed scrutiny given to 
77 The closest analogy is probably the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act (VHDPA), which created an extremely 
limited right to prevent copying of otherwise unprotectable boat hulls.  See Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. 
L. 105-304, §§ 501-02, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32).  This provision, which is 
essentially and well-deservedly unused, does not strike me as a model to be emulated.  In practical terms, proponents 
of expanding the law to protect fashion designs have faced controversy that has so far blocked change, even though 
the VHDPA was written precisely so that it could later be expanded to cover other subject matter.  See 17 U.S.C. § 
1301(b)(1); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Privacy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in 
Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1754 (2006).  Regardless of the merits of fashion design rights, the history of 
this provision indicates that putting a new right in the Copyright Act doesn’t go unnoticed, and that the label 
“copyright” doesn’t refute the legal and policy arguments deployed against expansion.  
78 See 17 U.S.C. § 102; see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-735, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6936-37. 
79 See Susan Corbett, The Case for Joint Ownership of Copyright in Photographs of  Identifiable Persons, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343357 (forthcoming Media & Arts L. Rev. Dec. 2013) 
(advocating that all photographic subjects should have copyrights in photos of them). 
80 See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 
(1987); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §66 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958). 
81 Cf. Don Herzog, As Many as Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75 CAL. L. REV. 609, 629 (1987) (arguing 
that, even if there are plausible arguments over constitutional meaning, it would be a misreading of the Constitution 
to read it “as the story of a small boy growing up in Kansas”). 
                                                 
copyright laws would protect this new right if it were called copyright.  However, no judge is 
that bald-faced about formalism, as Bambauer recognizes.82  The Supreme Court has specifically 
identified fair use as a key constitutional limit on copyright,83 and his proposal removes fair use 
as a defense.   
 
Because the “traditional contours” of copyright would be altered in every particular by the new 
intimate media right, some other kind of First Amendment scrutiny would have to apply.  
Bambauer suggests that his proposed newsworthiness defense would suffice to allow the new 
right to survive First Amendment scrutiny, based on precedent from privacy cases.84  Here, the 
snake swallows its own tail, formalism (copyright is a First Amendment-free zone) converting to 
functionalism (newsworthiness is an appropriate defense) just at the point at which Bambauer 
acknowledges that labels can’t be dispositive.   
 
Bambauer offers the following dichotomy: “copyright is left with an uncomfortable dilemma: 
either the line of cases finding newsworthiness to be adequate free speech protection in other 
contexts is misguided, or fair use must be analyzed formalistically.”85  There’s another 
alternative, which is that copyright is doing different things than other laws, requiring different 
First Amendment limits.  One could equally assert that fair use in every copyright case, including 
Prince v. Cariou as it was actually litigated, could constitutionally be replaced by 
newsworthiness, or by the constitutionally required limits on defamation.  One could also argue 
that the requirements of falsity and malice for defamation could be replaced with fair use’s 
consideration of transformativeness and market harm.  Those switches don’t make sense, 
however, because the justifications for the rights, and correspondingly the interests involved on 
both sides, differ.   
 
Current precedents from the privacy torts could make newsworthiness a sufficient First 
Amendment limit on the new intimate media right, certainly as applied to individual uploaders.86  
But a key question, unanswered by Bambauer’s analysis, is how newsworthiness would interact 
with new forms of dissemination.  Newsworthiness case law developed in the context of 
traditional publishers’ deliberate selections of what to publish.  Imposing liability on ISPs for 
non-newsworthy images disseminated by their users is not obviously constitutional, certainly not 
when it comes to vicarious liability, which doesn’t require knowledge.87  In general, the Supreme 
82 Bambauer at 49. 
83 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20, 222 (stating that copyright is, absent alterations to its “traditional 
contours,” constitutionally unproblematic) (2003). 
84 Bambauer at 49-50. 
85 Bambauer at 52.   
86 A case he cites with favor, Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Gp., 572 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009), see Bambauer at 51, has 
very weak reasoning.  Upholding a privacy claim against the publication of nude photos, though not against the 
publication of text about the photos, the Toffoloni court declined to give any weight to the veridical effects of the 
photos.  This is not to say that other courts won’t follow that reasoning.  Courts are often willing to treat images as 
worthless, unless they’re treating them as ineffable.  See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of 
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 707, 708 & n. 112 (2012).  For these purposes, I simply wish to note that what 
Bambauer presents as a descriptive claim—the case law suggests that his proposed new right is constitutional—ends 
up having strong normative implications as well: suppressing images is no great loss. 
87 See Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the 
Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11 (2006); Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309 (2008) 
(arguing that the First Amendment puts constitutional limits on intermediary liability even in copyright). 
                                                 
Court has been wary of liability for speech distributors in the absence of fault.88  Even if this new 
right might be constitutional as applied to perfidious individuals, then, the key part of the 
remedy—its extension to intermediaries, which defeats § 230’s immunity—might not be. 
 
D. Me Too: Other candidates for “copyright” extension 
 
Bambauer notes that we’ve increased copyright enforcement and remedies in order to go after 
massive online copying, without particular evidence that this helped copyright owners.89  Thus, 
he concludes, we need not be sure that his proposed reform would work before we enact it.  I 
don’t find that analogy persuasive.  It seems to me to be an argument about industry capture, not 
about good policy.  However, the comparison does strengthen my fear that any rights given to 
subjects of intimate media will be demanded on fairness and economic incentive grounds by 
other groups much better positioned to make incentive-based claims as rational economic actors 
seeking only profit maximization.  Given the expansions in the scope of copyright rights and 
remedies required to make Bambauer’s new right effective, the likely demands for parity 
between existing copyright rights and new intimate media rights strike me as undesirable side 
effects of putting his proposed new right in Title 17. 
 
I find particularly puzzling Bambauer’s contention that using copyright would solve the problem 
of § 230: 
 
[U]sing IP law effectively addresses issues with intimate media within the existing 
statutory framework for Internet intermediaries. Other approaches, such as privacy-based 
ones, would need to alter the contours of the immunity for interactive computer services  
from third-party liability created by Section 230 . . . . Some of these proposals would not 
merely alter Section 230, they would eviscerate it. This is undesirable. Section 230 has 
been critical to the development of a thriving Internet ecosystem based largely on content 
supplied by users.90 
 
But Bambauer’s proposal isn’t operating in secret.  It’s perfectly obvious that his new right is 
designed to evade § 230.  He even touts that as a virtue.  Yet other claimants are equally capable 
of deploying formalist concepts to serve realist ends.  Any attempt to enact this proposal would 
give everyone whose ox is gored by § 230 an opportunity to show up and argue that their 
interests should be considered “copyright” interests too, at least for purposes of avoiding § 230, 
since we’re already doing a lot of tailoring of “copyright” to deal with intimate media.  I can see 
no functional or political difference between amending Title 17 to evade § 230 and amending § 
88 E.g., U.S. v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 n.2, 76 n.5 (1994) (the First Amendment requires that a 
distributor must know the victim’s age to support a conviction for distributing child pornography; producers are in a 
unique position to verify age, and distributors are not); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (liability for 
distributing obscenity requires scienter).  Section 2257 of Title 18, mentioned above, also avoids constitutional 
problems by specifically limiting the obligations of non-producer disseminators—they can only be liable for 
knowingly selling or transferring materials without the requisite labels indicating that the producer kept the 
appropriate age and identity records.  In addition, they have “no duty to determine the accuracy of the contents of 
the statement or the records required to be kept.”  18 U.S.C. § 2257(f)(4). 
89 Bambauer at 23. 
90 Bambauer at 26. 
                                                 
230 itself.  Either intermediaries depend on § 230 and we should leave it alone, or we should be 
willing to tweak it to impose a new duty on them because revenge porn is so bad.   
 
Beyond § 230, many other claimants would have an interest in getting the benefits of this new 
right’s divergence from existing copyright rights.  For example, proponents of publicity rights 
could ask why other, nonsexual portrayals wouldn’t justify similar veto rights (subject to a 
newsworthiness defense).91  Additionally, Jessica Silbey’s empirical work reveals a strong desire 
for more rights to control reputation among creators; many of them would welcome a new moral 
right of withdrawal.92  Copyright owners of all stripes would also love to have a new right to 
control, and therefore monetize, private performance and display.  If this is a copyright, after all, 
then other copyright owners have similarly (and more plausibly incentive-based) claims for 
control.   
 
Likewise, many copyright owners would be thrilled to get rid of the timely registration 
requirement for statutory damages.  Most small copyright owners—precisely the group unlikely 
to timely register—have the same difficulties as victims of revenge porn in finding legal 
representation, and thus an equally compelling argument for extension of this new remedy to 
them.93  And copyright owners hate the burdens placed on them by the DMCA’s notice and 
takedown requirements, which they perceive as forcing them into an endless game of whack-a-
mole.94  If we’re creating a new notice and takedown scheme with different contours, surely their 
desires should be taken into account as well.  
 
III. Conclusion 
 
Bambauer’s paper challenges us to navigate the is and the ought: whatever copyright ought to be, 
he argues, is less important for people interested in protecting victims of nonconsensual exposure 
than what it is, which cannot be known at a conceptual level but can only be observed from the 
actual messy contours of copyright and therefore can be changed in order to serve any reasonable 
purpose.  But categories, however imperfect, exist for reasons—reasons that even realists 
generally acknowledge.  Contradictions and inconsistencies are inevitable, but that doesn’t mean 
they’re all of equal worth.  Bambauer’s claim that copyright can be whatever we want as long as 
we mention incentives seems to me not to be useful, in Felix Cohen’s formulation: “a definition 
91 See Corbett, supra note []. 
92 JESSICA SILBEY, HARVESTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IP INTERVENTIONS AND THE ROLES OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTIES IN CREATIVE AND INNOVATIVE WORK (Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2013 ), Ch. 4 (arguing 
that creators withhold works from certain markets because they fear loss of control). 
93 See, e.g., Osterreicher & Calzada, supra note [], at 7. 
94 For a very small but representatively vituperative set of criticisms, see Broadcast Music Inc., Comments of 
Broadcast Music, Inc. on Department of Commerce Copyright Green Paper, at 13-14, available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/bmi_comments.pdf; Global Intellectual Property Center, Chamber of Commerce, 
GIPC Comments To DOC on Digital Copyright Issues, at 6-7, available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/global_intellectual_property_center_comments.pdf; Independent Film & 
Television Alliance, Comments of IFTA, at 5-6, available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/independent_film_and_television_association_comments.pdf; National Music 
Publishers’ Association et al., Comments of National Muic Publishers’ Ass’n et al., at 14-15, available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/national_music_publishers_association_et._al._comments.pdf; Recording 
Industry Ass’n of America, Inc., Comments of the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc., at 4, available 
at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/recording_industry_association_of_america_comments.pdf. 
                                                 
is useful if it insures against risks of confusion more serious than any that the definition itself 
contains.”95  A more productive debate would consider a right against revenge porn, and the 
relationship between individual and intermediary liability for revenge porn, on its own merits. 
 
95 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CLOUM. L. REV. 809, 836 (1935). 
                                                 
